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The trend of Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court decisions
during the past decade has steadily reduced the number of lawful methods
which Pennsylvania law enforcement officials may use to prevent the
public exhibition of a motion picture they consider to be obscene. During
the summer of 1965 in Allegheny County, for example, detectives at-
tempted without success to halt the local showing of "Promises! Prom-
ises!," a film which they believed was legally obscene. The detectives
secured a search warrant, seized the films and arrested the exhibitors,
charging them with the crime of exhibiting an obscene motion picture.'
The officers apparently intended to hold the films pending completion of
the obscenity prosecution. If the films had been found obscene in the
criminal action, they would have been forfeited to the Commonwealth; if
not, they would have been returned to the exhibitors. The Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, however, held that the county govern-
ment could not interfere with the exhibition of the films prior to a judi-
cial determination that they were actually obscene.2 By court order
"Promises! Promises!" was returned to the exhibitors and presented as
scheduled in neighborhood theaters.
Although neither the Pennsylvania nor the United States Supreme
Courts has yet struck down the Pennsylvania statute3 authorizing seizures
of allegedly obscene motion pictures, there is little doubt that the proce-
dure used by the Allegheny County detectives in seizing "Promises!
Promises!" was constitutionally deficient. The United States Supreme
Court has expressly ruled that any governmental seizure of publications
on the ground of obscenity is an unconstitutional prior restraint if under-
taken prior to a judicial determination of the obscenity issue.4 The effect
of this policy is to deny enforcement officials their most effective means of
preventing the showing of films they consider to be obscene, i.e., seizing
and holding them until their obscenity has been determined. If the rulings
of the Supreme Court are followed, Pennsylvania officials must now rely
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B., Dartmouth College, 1957; MA., University
of Pittsburgh, 1962; LL.B., Yale University, 1964. Associated with Metz, Cook, Hanna &
Kelly, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 4528 (1963).
2. Harlequin Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Duggan, 113 P.L.J. 358, 364 (C. P. All'y County
1965).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 783 (1963).
4. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1960); A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
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solely on the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution to prevent the public
exhibition of obscene films. But fears exist that the threat of penal en-
forcement may not be enough to prevent all public exhibitions of obscene
films, and if such a film is shown, law enforcement officials may not, under
the present law, interfere with its exhibition pending the criminal trial.
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
Concern over this loophole in the existing system for controlling
obscene films has created pressures in the Commonwealth to establish a
statutory procedure which will require prior submission of films to a
censor. Such a system is suggested by House Bill 1098, which proposes a
State "Preview Board" to review questionable films and to initiate judi-
cial proceedings to enjoin the exhibition of films which the Board finds to
be obscene.5
The idea of a State Board to review films is not new to Pennsylvania.
The first Motion Picture Censorship Board was established in 1915 and
functioned until 1956 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
standard it applied unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.6 In 1959, the
Motion Picture Control Act revived the censorship system by giving a
Board of three gubernatorial appointees the power to forbid the showing
of any film they found to be obscene.7 In 1961 this procedure was held
unconstitutional in W. Goldman Theatres v. Dana' and has not been
5. House Bill 1098 was introduced by Messrs. Fineman, Perry, Rubin and Shelton, May
5, 1965, and was amended on a Second Reading June 29, 1965. The Senate companion bill
is Senate Bill 741 introduced May 4, 1965, by Messrs. Johanson, Donalow and Wade. The
operative sections of the Bill are as follows:
Section 2. Pennsylvania Motion Picture Preview Board.-The Pennsylvania Mo-
tion Picture Preview Board, hereinafter called the board, shall consist of a chairman
and two members; they shall be residents of Pennsylvania and shall be appointed
by the Governor for a term of four years ...
Section 3. Duties of Persons Who Sell, Lease, Lend, Exhibit or Use Films, Reels or
Views.-Every person intending to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any film, reel or
view in Pennsylvania, shall register with the board, giving his name, trade name
if any, and address. Each registrant shall notify the board in writing at least seventy-
two hours before the first showing of any film, reel or view in Pennsylvania, and
shall notify the board where and when each such showing will take place. Upon the
request of the board, the registrant shall furnish the board with an exact copy of
the film, reel or view for preview.
Section 5. Disapprovals by Board.-The board shall have the power to examine
any film, reel or view in order to determine whether such film, reel or view violates
standards set down by the courts for obscenity. If the board finds that any such
film, reel or view does violate the standards it shall immediately begin injunction
proceedings in the court of common pleas of the county where the film, reel or view
is about to be shown. The court shall make its determination within five days.
6. Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 70.1-.14 (1963).
8. 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
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replaced; House Bill 1098 attempts to fill the statutory gap left by the
Goldman case.9
The proposed "preview" system differs significantly from its unconsti-
tutional predecessor, the Motion Picture Control Act, although its pre-
ventive purpose and administrative structure are similar. As under the old
system, the Bill requires motion picture distributors and exhibitors to
register with the Board and to advise it where and when the intended
exhibition will take place, "at least seventy-two hours before the first
showing."' ° Each registrant is also required to furnish the Board with a
copy of any film requested by the Board." From this point on, however,
the proposed "preview" procedure makes a marked departure from the
earlier law. The decision of the former Board that a film was obscene
made its exhibition anywhere in the Commonwealth a crime. The old
Board's decision was made without a hearing and could only be challenged
in lengthy and costly appellate proceedings, during which time the film
could not be shown. In contrast, the proposed Board will have no power
to ban any film. If the Board finds a film to be obscene, it may do only
one thing-present a claim in Common Pleas Court that the film is obscene
and demand an injunction barring its exhibition or distribution. The deci-
sion on obscenity is to be made "within five days" by "the court of com-
mon pleas of the county where the film . . . is about to be shown"; if the
injunction is granted, any exhibition of the film thereafter is punishable
under the criminal contempt statute. 2
HOUSE BILL 1098 AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The draftsmen of House Bill 1098 believe that their "preview" system
"meets all of the constitutional requirements and will provide the degree
of care that we should have in the dissemination of films."" The first
inquiry, therefore, is whether the system can survive the claims of uncon-
stitutionality that will surely be made against it. In this writer's view,
the Bill fails to meet the requirements of the United States and Pennsyl-
vania constitutions because of its effect as a prior restraint and because
it denies exhibitors a jury trial on the issue of obscenity.
4. Senator Johanson made the following comment upon introducing the Senate Bill:
"Mr. President, we have always had, at least, since the advent of the motion pictures in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a Board of Review or a Censor Board, which has, lately,
run into a great deal of difficulty in having its rulings enforced, because of the high regard
the Courts have for freedom of expression and freedom of speech. This, pretty much, has
emasculated the actions of that Board." 1 Sen. Jour. 475 (1965).
10. The former statute required only forty-eight hours notice.
11. The old Board could review the film only after it had "been exhibited at least once in
Pennsylvania."
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2047-48 (1963).
13. Sen. Jour., supra note 9, at 475 (remarks of Senator Johanson).
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United States Constitution
In the context of film censorship, prior restraint refers to the degree
to which government action either deters motion picture distributors and
exhibitors from agreeing to lease films for future exhibition or deters
exhibitors from showing films they have already leased. House Bill 1098
will interfere with the leasing and exhibition of films in three ways. First,
before a motion picture may be shown in public, the exhibitor must
register with the Board, give notice of his intent to show the film, and then
wait three days. Any exhibition in violation of these requirements is a
crime. Second, publication of the Board's decision that the film is obscene
and its claim in court to that effect will deter exhibitors from showing the
allegedly obscene film and from agreeing to lease it for future exhibitions.
The United States Supreme Court has graphically described how com-
munication of the censor's view that a film is obscene may have a "dis-
couraging" and "chilling effect" on exhibitors and distributors, even
when the censor's decision requires judicial action for its enforcement:
Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very
little to deter exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor's stake
in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted
and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the other
hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens and delays
of litigation in a particular area when, without such difficulties,
he can freely exhibit his film in most of the rest of the country;
for we are told that only four states and a handful of munici-
palities have active censorship laws. 4
In addition, a Board finding of obscenity will generate, throughout the
state, the fear that any public exhibition of the film is an invitation to
criminal prosecution by local authorities under the anti-obscenity stat-
ute.' 5 For example, in the face of an adverse Board finding and the initia-
tion of injunction proceeding in Allegheny County, how many other
exhibitors in Pennsylvania would be willing to exhibit the contested film
or to lease it for future exhibition? For even if the film is found not to be
obscene in the Allegheny County injunction proceeding, other exhibitors
still face both the possibility of Board action against them, and if they
show the film, the possibility of criminal prosecution. Thus, whether a
motion picture is legally obscene or not, an adverse finding by the Board
will have a deterrent effect on its leasing and exhibition throughout
Pennsylvania.
14. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). Of the four statewide systems to
which the Court referred, Maryland's was struck down in the Freedman decision and
New York's was held unconstitutional in Cambist Films v. Bd. of Regents of Univ., 260
N.Y.S.2d 804 (1965), leaving only West Virginia and Kansas with statewide systems.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4528 (1963).
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The third prior restraint in the proposed system will operate when the
court grants a preliminary injunction. The Board's injunction action
will be brought under Pennsylvania Civil Procedure Rule 1531, which
authorizes a five-day preliminary injunction without "written notice and
hearing" if the court believes that "immediate and irreparable injury will
be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held." Thus, if a film
which the Board has found to be obscene is scheduled to begin a three-day
showing the day after the Board's complaint is filed, the court might very
well issue a temporary injunction pending the hearing on the obscenity
issue. During the preliminary injunction, exhibition of the film would be
forbidden and the pressure on other exhibitors to find alternative films
would be further increased.
Even though the Supreme Court has not passed on legislation of the
type House Bill 1098 recommends, recent decisions in the censorship
area provide considerable insight into the Court's probable response to
the Bill. Over the past decade the Court has shown growing antagonism
to all governmental prior restraints. As stated in Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan,'6 "[a]ny system of prior restraint of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'
7
The Court has demonstrated this hostility during the last five years by
expressly forbidding any seizure of printed material prior to an adversary
hearing, regardless of the grounds on which the seizure is based,'" and by
striking down, in Freedman v. Maryland," a system which gave to a film
censorship Board the final decision on obscenity.
Nevertheless the Court has not banned all systems which require prior
submission of films to a censor, and such a ruling is unlikely in the near
future. In fact, the Court's opinion in Freedman, its latest on this problem,
spells out at length the procedural requirements for a system requiring
prior submission. The problem with the Freedman opinion, however, is
that the Maryland statute which the decision struck down failed to meet
any of the requirements established in the opinion, thereby leaving the
Freedman guidelines without any factual basis. Apparently sensing this
problem, Justice Brennan expressly recommended, as a model for future
legislation, a New York injunction statute directed at the sale and distribu-
tion of obscene books and magazines, which the Court held constitutional
in 1957.20 Expectations about the Court's response to House Bill 1098,
therefore, are largely based on the Freedman opinion and the Court-ap-
proved New York statute.
16. 372 U.S. 58 (1962).
17. Id. at 70.
18. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1960); A Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
19. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
20. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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Freedman established four procedural requirements, three of which the
Bill clearly meets. First, the burden of proving obscenity "must rest on the
censor.")21 There is no problem here, nor is there difficulty with the second
requirement, that the censor must, "within a specified brief period, either
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film."2 The proposed
Board will not actually license films, but if a preliminary injunction is not
granted within three days, the film may be shown as if licensed. The third
requirement of a "prompt final judicial determination '23 of the obscenity
issue is probably satisfied by the Bill's requirement that the "court shall
make its determination within five days."
The fourth requirement, that "any restraint imposed in advance of a
final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution,"2 will, however, create a difficult problem.
Although the Freedman language quoted above appears fairly permissive,
other language in the opinion and Justice Brennan's express recommenda-
tion of the New York statute suggest that the proposed system may very
possibly be held excessive, especially when the court issues a five-day
preliminary injunction without a hearing on the obscenity issue.
The final test of constitutionality under Freedman is whether the total
system sufficiently eliminates the "dangers of a censorship system."2
Applying this test to the prior restraint issue, it is apparent that the pro-
posed system has a significantly greater number of such dangers than the
recommended New York statute. The New York system "postpones any
restraint against sale until a judicial determination of obscenity following
notice and an adversary hearing,"26 whereas the proposed system au-
thorizes a five-day preliminary injunction. This is a major difference
between the two systems. Nor does the New York statute require prior
submissions to a censor or impose an initial restraint before the first
publication.
There are also more subtle differences which add to the "dangers" of
the proposed system. First, the Bill gives a major part of the censoring
job to a Board of professional censors, whereas the New York statute
delegates the power to initiate injunction proceedings to city, town and
village officials. The Court has emphasized on more than one occasion that
"[t]he censor is part of the executive structure, and there is at least some
danger that he will develop an institutionalized bias in favor of censorship
21. Freedman v. Maryland, supra note 14, at 58.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 60.
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because of his particular responsibility. ' 7 Under the proposed system, it
is reasonable to expect the Board's institutional bias to produce more
frequent claims of obscenity against non-obscene films, with a resulting
deterrent effect on their exhibition and distribution, than would be the
case if the competence to initiate proceedings were placed in the hands of
local government officials. Second, because the Board will be a State
organ, acting with the approval of the legislature, and manned by guber-
natorial appointees, presumably qualified to pass on questions of ob-
scenity, its findings will have far greater authority and influence than those
of a local governmental official. There is no question that a Board-finding
of obscenity will increase local pressures throughout the state to initiate
criminal prosecutions against exhibitors showing the allegedly obscene
film. Third, because the Board is given competence to initiate proceedings
anywhere in Pennsylvania, the statewide impact of an adverse Board
decision will be further intensified. Since under the New York statute a
local official has competence to act only against articles sold and distrib-
uted in his political subdivision, the "chilling effect" of his decision to
initiate court proceedings is geographically far more limited.
Because an adverse Board decision will have such a substantial state-
wide deterrent effect on the leasing and exhibition of films which the
Board finds obscene, it is possible that the Bill will be held unconstitu-
tional on its face. It is even more probable that an application of the
statute granting a five-day preliminary injunction (which would be in
addition to the initial three-day initial restraint) will fail to meet the
Court's requirements of a permissible censorship system. And without the
five-day preliminary injunction, the Bill fails in its primary purpose of
barring any exhibition of an allegedly obscene film pending judicial deter-
mination of the obscenity issue.
House Bill 1098 presents a further constitutional issue which has not
been passed on by the court. By requiring that the court "shall make its
determination on the obscenity question within five days" after the in-
junction action is begun by the Board, does the Bill afford the defendant
a reasonable time to prepare his defense on the obscenity issue?2" Assum-
ing a two-day trial, the defendant is left with three days to prepare, and
as presently drafted, the Bill gives the court no discretion to extend this
time limit. The insufficiency of this time is suggested by Justice Harlan's
recent statement that "it would be unrealistic to suppose that most persons
who allegedly have or sell obscene materials will be able to prepare for
such a hearing in four days."29 He also advanced the opinion "[e]leven
27. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 223 (1964); Freedman
v. Maryland, supra note 14, at 57-58.
28. See, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) ; Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298
Pa. 169, 148 At. 73 (1929).
29. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, supra note 26, at 220.
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days is certainly not an undue delay; indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
defense being prepared in less time. '30
The defendant's difficulty in quickly preparing for trial has been in-
creased by the Court's ruling in Jacobellis v. Ohio" that a "national
standard" must be applied in determining whether a film is obscene. If
the film in issue has been shown nationally, counsel must present evidence
of nationwide public and professional reaction to the film. The record in
lacobellis reflects the amount of work this requirement creates. If the film
has not been extensively reviewed, counsel will probably be required to
obtain expert opinions on the film's compatibility with national standards.
Defense counsel's disadvantage in this regard is further increased by the
Board's freedom to select its targets well in advance, thereby giving itself
ample time to prepare. Even if these inequities are not fatal to the Bill,
they will further dispose the Court to hold the Bill unconstitutional as an
excessive prior restraint.
Pennsylvania Constitution
The constitutional difficulties awaiting House Bill 1098 will begin,
however; before the first case reaches the United States Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in W. Goldman Theatres v.
Dana," which struck down Pennsylvania's old censorship Board, clearly
suggests that the proposed Bill fails to meet the requirements of Penn-
sylvania's Constitution. In Goldman the Court held that, on its face, the
earlier act was a prior restraint in violation of Article I, § 7 of the state
constitution."3 Two restraining features of the system were found objec-
tionable: (a) "the Act expressly restrains the initial showing of a film
for 48 hours after notice to the Board of its intended exhibition," and
(b) it forbid exhibition of a film solely upon disapproval of the Board.
34
Although House Bill 1098 clearly corrects the second defect, it intensifies
the first deficiency by increasing the initial prior restraint from forty-eight
to seventy-two hours. Because the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
greater freedom of expression than the United States Constitution, it is
probable that the seventy-two hour prior restraint and the restraining
features of the Bill discussed earlier will lead the Court to hold that the
Bill violates Article I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Goldman also held the old system incompatible with Article I, §§ 6 & 9,
which guarantee trial by jury. The former statute expressly forbid any
30. Id. at 221.
31.378 U.S. 184 (1964).
32. 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
33. The material provision of Article I, § 7 reads as follows: "... The free communica-
tion of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of men, and every citizen may
freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty. .. ."
34. W. Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 92-93, 173 A.2d 59, 64 (1961).
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exhibition in violation of the Board's order. Consequently in prosecutions,
under the statute, the only issue before the jury was whether the defendant
had shown the film after the Board's order. The Court held this procedure
to be a denial of the right to a jury trial.
Since one accused, cannot constitutionally be punished for the
utterance of alleged obscene matter except upon a finding by an
impartial jury of the vicinage that the matter was in fact obscene,
such result cannot be achieved by the artful device of granting to
administrative officials the power to disapprove the utterance
... and impose a criminal penalty for a violation of their prohibi-
tion. Constitutionally protected rights are not to be so adroitly
subverted. 5 (Emphasis added.)
House Bill 1098 substitutes a Common Pleas judge for the censorship
Board as the decision maker on the obscenity issue. While this puts the
decision in court, it does not place it with an "impartial jury." The only
participation of a jury will be in a prosecution under the contempt statute.
And in that proceeding the defendant will be entitled to a jury trial on
the question of whether he showed the film in violation of the court's
order, but not on the issue of whether the film "was in fact obscene."
Because the Bill fails to provide a jury trial on the obscenity issue, it will
almost certainly be struck down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
HOUSE BILL 1098 AS PUBLIC POLICY
In the opinion of its sponsors, House Bill 1098 will provide for the
people of Pennsylvania "the degree of care that we should have in the
dissemination of films." 6 As presently drafted, the Bill is designed to
protect the entire population, both adults and children, from exposure to
legally obscene films whose public exhibition is not deterred by threat of
prosecution under the anti-obscenity statute. The Bill provides no means
of preventing showings to children of films which are not legally obscene
but which are considered unsuitable for children. In the view of this
writer, the Bill dwells exclusively on an insignificant problem at the
expense of the one motion picture problem in Pennsylvania that deserves
legislative attention.
The Bill is based on the assumption that in spite of the anti-obscenity
penal statute, a large enough number of legally obscene motion pictures
is exhibited in Pennsylvania each year to justify the cost, controversy and
interference with constitutionally protected films which the proposed
system will produce. But how many legally obscene films have been pub-
licly exhibited in Pennsylvania since the former censorship act was held
unconstitutional in 1961? A review of the official reports of judicial deci-
35. Id. at 95, 173 A.2d at 65.
36. Sen. Jour., supra note 9, at 475 (remarks of Senator Johanson).
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sions and opinions since that date does not reveal a single case. The
reader is asked to recall, since that date, a conviction for public exhibition
of an obscene film in Pennsylvania. The conclusion is inescapable that
the penal statute forbidding the exhibition of obscene films does an effec-
tive job of deterring their exhibition in public theaters. Had the proposed
system been in effect since 1961, what legally obscene films would it have
kept from Pennsylvania movie screens? In fact, the experience in Penn-
sylvania since 1961 makes it difficult to see what function it will serve
except to deter the exhibition and leasing of constitutionally protected
films. Also, the insignificance of the social problem at which the Bill is
directed will probably further dispose the Pennsylvania and United States
Supreme Courts to find the system an unreasonable prior restraint.
Equally unfortunate is the Bill's failure to deal with the one motion
picture problem worthy of legislative attention-the protection of children
from films which may have a detrimental effect on their emotional, moral
and social development. While scientific knowledge about the effect of
motion pictures on children is definitely lacking, there is a widespread
belief that certain types of motion pictures, which are not "legally"
obscene, may have harmful effects on children.17 The unconstitutional
Motion Picture Control Act recognized this problem by empowering the
Board to forbid "exhibition to children" of films which it considered
"unsuitable for children."38 Any injunction system should provide the
same remedy.
A statute limited to the protection of children from obscene and "un-
suitable" films would not only serve a useful purpose but also would
eliminate most of the constitutional problems created by the present Bill.
As the Pennsylvania legislature pointed out in its preamble to the Comic
Book Act, "the danger of restricting freedom of the press is avoided by
merely regulating the access of children under the age of eighteen to
obscene publications."39 Also on this point, the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that "State and local authorities might well consider
whether their objectives in this area would be better served by laws aimed
specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to chil-
dren, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination." 4
A system designed exclusively to protect children from "obscene" and
"unsuitable" films would, in certain cases, also act as a deterrent to the
exhibition of obscene films to adults. After a court has expressly found a
film to be legally obscene, as well as unsuitable for children, and has
barred its exhibition to children, it is hard to imagine a responsible ex-
hibitor who would thereafter exhibit the film to any audience.
37. See, W. Goldman Theatres v. Dana, supra note 33, at 106-112, 173 A.2d at 79-85.
38. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 4, § 70.5 (1963).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3831 (1963).
40. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 30, at 195.
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A further question about the proposed system is this: why should the
exclusive competence to initiate injunction proceedings be centralized in
a Board of gubernatorial appointees? Whether legislation is intended to
protect children or the entire community, this objective would be better
served if the power to initiate injunction proceedings were given to govern-
mental officials in local communities. Executive officers of political sub-
divisions are certainly more sensitive to community attitudes and sensi-
bilities than the proposed Board would be. A decentralization of this
power to commence legal proceedings would not only be more consistent
with democratic practices, but it would, through the political process,
empower local communities to protect themselves from films they consider
objectionable.
Because most local officials have neither the time nor the means to
preview films prior to exhibition, the legislature should give local com-
munities the option of deciding whether or not local exhibitors must give
advance notice and advance showings to local officials. There is every
reason to expect that neighborhood exhibitors would be willing to provide,
for local officials, voluntary private showings early enough to ensure an
orderly final disposition of the injunction proceedings before the scheduled
exhibition date. Both film exhibitors and local officials share a common
interest in seeing to it that a voluntary system of this type works, espe-
cially if the local government has the power to require advance notice and
showings.
CONCLUSION
Legislation already on the books provides the framework for a con-
stitutional and workable system along the lines suggested above. A few
simple amendments to Pennsylvania's Comic Book Act will produce a
less radical and a far more effective system than the one recommended
by House Bill 1098.
The Comic Book Act authorizes the District Attorney to institute
equity proceedings to enjoin sales to children under eighteen, of any book
or publication "which is obscene or which teaches or advocates the use of
narcotics."'" First, the subject matter of the statute should be expanded
to include motion pictures; this would create a comprehensive statute
covering both films and publications. Second, the grounds for injunctive
relief should be broadened to cover films which are "unsuitable for chil-
dren." This change would create a remedy tailored to the real problem-
the protection of children. Third, the injunctive power should be restricted
to sales and exhibitions to children under eighteen years. This will elimi-
nate the dangers of an unconstitutional prior restraint. Fourth, by elimi-
nating the centralized "Preview Board" and placing the power to initiate
injunctive proceedings with executive officials of political subdivisions,
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3832.1 (1963).
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local communities will be able to act when their officials perceive a danger
to community standards and values; this change should be made whether
or not the system is restricted to the protection of children. Finally, by
amending the Comic Book Act to provide a jury trial on the questions of
obscenity and unsuitability for children, the legislature will avoid a signifi-
cant danger of unconstitutionality in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In short, a few simple amendments to the Comic Book Act can produce a
constitutional system that squarely meets the motion picture problem in
Pennsylvania, whereas House Bill 1098 meets neither the problem nor
the requirements of the constitution.
